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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	CEA-01	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	C-01
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	EB-01	EUR-01	EXIM-06	E-01
	FRB-03	HA-09	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	ITC-01
	JUSE-00	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	OPIC-08	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00
	SS-00	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	/079W
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P 201456Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5309
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 04481

YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, EAID, PGOV, USUN, RW
SUBJECT: UNAMIR SUBMITS REPORT FOR MRIZY COUNCILX
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REF: KIGALI 4440

1.# CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE UN MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR) HAS ALREADY
SUBMITTED TO NEW YORK ITS APPRAISAL OF RWANDA'S
PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE ARUSHA PEACE ACCORD.
THIS REPORT WILL FORM THE BASIS FOR SECURITY COUNCIL
DELIBERATIONS JANUARY 5TH ON WHETHER TO EXTEND THE
UNAMIR MANDATE. THE UNAMIR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS TOLD

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN L MILLS
DATE/CASE ID: 01 NOV 2007 200103014

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CHARGE THE REPORT HAD TO BE IN NOW IN ORDER FOR TRANSLATION AND DISTRIBUTION PRIOR TO THE COUNCIL MEETING.

3. THE REPORTS WILL RECOMMEND, ACCORDING TO UNAMIR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS LTC ISLAM NABDUL, ACCELERATED DEPLOYMENT TO RWANDA OF TROOPS ALREADY SCHZOLED IN THE MISSION PLAM. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ORIGINAL REPORT CALLS FOR ALL 350 OBSERVERS TO BE IN RWANDA BY APRIL; UNAMIR WANTS THEM HERE BY FEBRUARY. INDEED, GHANA, MALI, AND BANGLADESH HAVE ALREADY ADVANCED THE ARRIVAL OF THEIR OBSERVERS FROM JANUARY TO DECEMBER. AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE, UNAMIR WOULD LIKE THE GHANIAN BATTALION TO ARRIVE IN FEBRUARY INSTEAD OF JUNE FOR DEPLOYMENT IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE.

4. COL. NAZRUL TOLD CHARGE THAT UNAMIR'S BIGGEST PROBLEM IS ITS INABILITY TO CONCENTRATE SUFFICIENT TROOPS IN A GIVEN AREA TO ASSURE THE REQUIRED SECURITY. HE SAID THAT IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH ALL OF
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THE TASKS RELATED TO SECURING KIGALI, UNAMIR HAD REDEPLOYED SOME OBSERVERS FROM THE DMZ TO KIGALI, LEAVING THE DMZ OBSERVERS STRETCHED THIN. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS A RISK GIVEN THE RECENT ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY UNKNOWN ASSAILANTS IN THE DMZ, BUT SAID IT HAD TO BE DONE. HE HOPED THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT WOULD NOT ATTRACT THEHRTTEION OF THOSE WHO MIGHT

WSH TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE REDUCED NUMBER OF UNAMIR FORCES IN THE NORTH. COL. NAZRUL STRESSED THAT UNAMIR WILL NOT BE SEEKING LARGER NUMBERS OF TROOPS, MERELY ADVANCED DEPLOYMENT.

5. COMMENT: EMBASSY RECOMMENDS DEPARTMENT SUPPORT ADVANCED DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR TROOPS TO RWANDA. IN RETROSPECT, THE UN RECONNAISSANCE MISSION MAY HAVE ERRED BY NOT GIVING EQUAL WEIGHT TO THE NEED FOR UN FORCES IN KIGALI AND OUTSIDE OF KIGALI DURING THE INITIAL PHASES OF IMPLEMENTATION. WE BELIEVE THAT THAT OVERSIGHT CAN BE CORRECTED BY ADVANCING DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS ALREADY REQUESTED FOR THE UN FORCE TO RWANDA. WE APPRECIATE UNAMIR'S SENSITIVITY TO THE FACT THAT IT CANNOT EXPECT TO ASK FOR MORE TROOPS THAM ALREADY INCLUDED IN ITS REPORT TO THE

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SECURITY COUNCIL, AND THAT IT MUST BE CREATIVE IN ITS
USE OF THOSE ALREADY REQUESTED.

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